information or on heuristics, while individuals in a negative mood are more likely to focus on the specific details of information (e.g., Bless et al., 1996; Storbeck & Clore, 2005) .
It has been unclear to what extent these laboratory findings extend to real-life events infused with emotional importance. Research on autobiographical memory often has supported the opposite conclusion from laboratory research: that positive memories are more vivid than negative ones (e.g., D'Argembeau et al., 2003; Schaefer & Philippot, 2005; Walker et al., 2003) . However, some studies suggest little effect of valence on memory vividness, and instead have found intensity to be the primary predictor of autobiographical memory characteristics (e.g., Talarico et al., 2004) . Only a handful of studies have compared memories of a negative public event to memories of a positive event (Winograd & Killinger, 1983; Scott & Ponsoda, 1996; Tekcan, 2001; Berntsen & Thomsen, 2005) . Taken together, these studies convincingly demonstrate that positive events can be associated with vivid memories. They do not, however, allow strong comparisons to be made between the quality of the positively-and negatively-valenced memories. The positive and negative events often were not rated as equally arousing, surprising, or emotionally intense (Berntsen & Thomsen, 2005; Winograd & Killinger, 1983 ; see also commentary by Wright & Anderson, 1996 on Scott & Ponsoda, 1996 , were not rehearsed equally (Tekcan, 2001) , and differed in whether they were public or private events (Tekcan, 2001) . These different event features make it extremely difficult Valence and Memory 5 to disentangle the specific effects of valence on memory. Moreover, these studies only examined memory at one time point, long after the event's occurrence. Although Berntsen and Thomsen (2005) used an innovative approach to examine accuracy for some contextual features using historical records, many contextual elements of a memory (e.g., a person's location) could not be retrospectively checked.
To our knowledge, only one prior study has examined the effect of positive versus negative valence on both the subjective vividness and the objective accuracy of adults' memories for a public event (see Baker-Ward et al., 2005 for an investigation of children's memories). Levine and Bluck (2004) asked participants to determine whether or not particular events had occurred during the verdict decision in the O.J. Simpson trial.
The critical findings from their study were that participants who were happy about the verdict were not able to discriminate true from false details of the event any better than individuals unhappy about the verdict, and yet the happy group believed they remembered the event more vividly, and were more liberal in accepting that something had occurred. These data are generally consistent with laboratory demonstrations that positive mood can lead to an increased probability of memory errors (e.g., Bless et al., 1996; Storbeck & Clore, 2005) .
As in Levine and Bluck (2004) , the present study examined memory for the same event (the final game of the 2004 Boston Red Sox vs. New York Yankees playoff series 1 )
in participants who found the event's outcome to be highly positive (Red Sox fans), highly negative (Yankees fans) or relatively nonemotional. This design removes many of 1 We consider this game to be a highly emotional public event for Red Sox and Yankees fans because of the intense nature of the Red Sox-Yankees rivalry for fans on both sides, the national attention that focused on this series, and the surprising (indeed unprecedented) outcome in which the Red Sox reversed decades of defeat and won the series, becoming the first team in baseball history to come back and win from a 3-0 series deficit.
the potential confounds that can result from event differences (e.g., extent of media coverage, event duration, public or private nature of event). Our study methodology differed from that of Levine and Bluck (2004) in two important ways. First, we assessed memory via cued recall rather than recognition. Recall may be more sensitive in detecting valence-based differences in memory, because individuals cannot rely on familiarity alone to support their endorsement of a detail. Thus, to the extent that positive valence boosts familiarity-based processing while negative valence enhances recollective processing (and see Ochsner, 2000 for evidence), the disparity between details remembered by individuals happy versus unhappy about the event outcome may be greater on a task of recall than on a task of recognition. Second, the present study assessed memory for both event-related and personal details. A number of studies have suggested that the aspects of an event most closely tied to the emotional response will be those better remembered: individuals who are more personally involved in an event will tend to remember more event-related details, while individuals less personally involved in the event will tend to remember more personal details (e.g., Pezdek, 2003) . There also may be different resiliencies for the two types of details: Memory for event-related details sometimes declines more over time than memory for personal details (Smith et al., 2003) . The studies comparing memory for event-related and personal details have focused on memory for negative events, however, leaving open the question of whether valence would affect the types of details most likely to be remembered (and see Berntsen, 2002 for evidence that valence can selectively influence memory for particular types of details).
Thus, the present study was designed to address three main goals. First, we assessed whether the amount of detail remembered about an emotional event is affected by its valence. Second, we investigated whether valence affects a memory's vividness, its consistency, or a person's confidence in its accuracy. Third, we examined whether the effect of valence on memory differed for the event-related and personal details.
Methods
Participants. Participants were 76 young adults 2 (40 women, ages 18-35) recruited via fliers posted around the greater Boston area. We restricted our sample to those individuals who had watched the game, and did not include reports from individuals who had learned about the outcome of the game in another way. We recruited participants who were strong Red Sox supporters, participants who were avid Yankees fans, and participants who were self-described as "a baseball fan who watched the game, but without any strong feelings about the game's outcome . Only the data regarding the baseball game will be discussed 2 We included only young adults in this study because prior research has suggested that aging may impact the likelihood of vividly remembering emotional events (e.g., Cohen et al., 1994; Tekcan & Peynircioglu, 2002) .
3 Because of the large number of college students in our sample, team affiliation tended to be associated with a participant's home town (e.g., most of the Yankees fans had grown up in the New York area; many individuals who were neither Red Sox nor Yankees fans closely followed the games of their hometown team).
here. Surveys were completed within 6 days of the game (Time 1) and after a 23-27 week delay (Time 2).
Survey Scoring. Time 1 surveys were scored for the quantity of information recalled.
Time 2 surveys were scored for the quantity of information recalled, the consistency of the information recalled 4 (as compared to the information provided at Time 1), the confidence in the memory, and the reported vividness of the memory.
Quantity of Recalled Information. Quantity scores at Time 1 and Time 2 were calculated by tallying how many pieces of information the participants provided to all of the event-related questions or to all of the personal detail questions 5 . All responses received 0, 0.5, or 1 point. Scores of 0 indicated that no information was recalled; 0.5 points were awarded when some information was recalled but it was only partially accurate (e.g., reporting a score of 9 to 3 rather than 10 to 3) or somewhat vague (e.g., the game was watched "at home"); 1 point was given for each specific detail recalled (e.g., the game was watched from the couch). Scoring was conducted by two research assistants and the average of the two scores was used in all analyses. Inter-rater reliability was high (all Cronbach's alpha > .85).
Consistency of Recalled Information. When a piece of information was reported entirely differently at Time 2 than at Time 1, the consistency score was 0. A piece of information recalled in a slightly different manner at Time 2 than at Time 1 (e.g., eating pepperoni pizza versus eating cheese pizza) was awarded 0.5 points. If exactly the same detail was recalled at both time points, 1 point was awarded. Additional information provided at Time 2 did not impact the consistency scores. In this way, consistency at Time 2 was determined for each piece of information provided at Time 1. Consistency scores for each question were then translated into proportions, with the sum of the consistency scores in the numerator, and the sum of the points awarded at Time 1 in the denominator. Thus, if a person recalled 2 details at Time 1, and if one of those details was recalled consistently at Time 1 (=1 point) and one of those details was recalled in a slightly distorted manner (=0.5 points), the consistency score would be 1.5/2 = .75).
So as not to confound memory distortion with forgetting, we did not include in the consistency analyses any question that remained unanswered at time 1 or time 2.
Thus, a consistency score of 0 never signified that a person remembered nothing at Time 1 or Time 2, but rather that s/he did not remember any of the same details at the two timepoints.
Assessments of Confidence and Vividness. For each question answered at Time 2, participants were asked to rate their confidence in the response on a 1-5 scale 6 . We computed an average confidence for responses to event-related details and for responses regarding personal details. Participants reported vividness on a 1-7 scale.
Results
Emotion and Rehearsal Variables. We first examined the scores for the emotion and rehearsal variables for the game (Table 1) . Participants fell into one of three categories:
Those for whom the event was positive (41 of the 76 participants [21 women] gave valence ratings of 5.5 or higher on a 7-point scale), negative (20 participants [10 women] gave valence ratings of 2.5 or lower), or neither positive nor negative 78 (15 participants [9 women ] gave valence ratings between 3 and 5). Ratings of intensity did not significantly differ between those who found the event positive and negative (p>.4), and the nonemotional group rated the event as less intense than either of those groups (t>4.5, p<.001). The positive and negative groups also did not differ in their ratings for personal importance of the event, surprise, number of emotions generated, or rehearsal variables (all p>.25). For each of these variables, the individuals who found the event to be positive or negative gave higher ratings than the individuals who found the event to be neither positive nor negative (all p<.05; Table 1 ). and of group (more details remembered by the positive and negative group than by the 7 As with many real-life emotional events, the emotionality of this event likely developed and changed during its course. It is impossible to know whether the event became positive or negative only upon its termination (i.e., when the final outcome was known), or whether, because it was the last in a series of games in which the Red Sox had enjoyed a tremendous comeback, the valence was in some way established before the game's completion. This ambiguity only is critical to the extent that one would like to claim that valence is exerting its effects during encoding, rather than during consolidation or retrieval. We make no claims about during which memory phase valence is exerting its effects, and it often is difficult to disentangle encoding, consolidation, and retrieval effects in behavioral studies of emotional memory. But given prior evidence that participants' mood at retrieval can influence memory accuracy (e.g., Levine & Bluck, 2004) , it certainly is plausible that effects aside from those operating at encoding mediate the valence effects seen here.
8 A potential limitation of this study is that we had fewer participants in the negative and the neutral groups than in the positive groups. neutral group; F(2,74) = 5.18, p<.01, partial eta-squared = .14), an interaction between detail type and group (memory for event-related details more affected by group status than memory for personal details; F(2,74) = 4.89, p<.05, partial eta-squared = .13), an interaction between detail type and time (memory for event-related details declining more than memory for personal details over the delay; F(1,75) = 10.43, p<.01, partial etasquared = .14), and an interaction among detail type, time, and group (F(2,74) = 4.03, p<.05, partial eta-squared = .11). This three-way interaction reflected the fact that, particularly at time 2, event-related details were recalled marginally better by the negative group than by the positive group (p<.10) whereas the positive and negative groups recalled comparable amounts of personal detail (see Table 2 and Figure 1 ). It is important to note that this interaction occurred despite a comparable total number of details recalled in the two groups (collapsing across event-related and personal details, Consistency. An ANOVA with detail type (event-related, personal) as a withinsubject factor and group (positive, negative, neutral) as a between-subject factor revealed a main effect of group (negative group most consistent; F(1,75) = 15.48, p<.05, partial eta-squared = .10) and an interaction between group and detail type (effect of group greater for personal details than for event-related details; F(2,74) = 4.21, p<.05, partial eta-squared = .10; see Table 3 ).
Confidence. An ANOVA with detail type (event-related, personal) as a withinsubject factor and group (positive, negative, neutral) as a between-subject factor revealed Valence and Memory 12 no effect of detail type or group (partial eta-squared < .04) but showed an interaction between the two (F(2,74) = 10.56, p<.001, partial eta-squared = .24). Confidence for the event-related details was marginally higher in participants who found the event to be negative (p<.10), whereas confidence in the accuracy of personal details was highest in participants who found the event to be positive (p<.01; see Table 3 ).
Vividness. An ANOVA with detail type (event-related, personal) as a withinsubject factor and group (positive, negative, neutral) as a between-subject factor revealed a main effect of detail (personal details more vivid than event-related details; F(1,73) = 105.1, p<.001, partial eta-squared = .63) but no effect of group nor an interaction between group and detail (partial eta-squared < .05). Tables 2 and 3 In terms of the total number of details remembered (collapsing across eventrelated and personal details), positive vs. negative valence had no effect: Both valence groups remembered a comparable number of details, and each remembered significantly more details than the neutral group. However, valence did influence the type of detail recalled: While positive and negative groups remembered an equal number of personal details, the negative group remembered more event-related details than the positive group. This finding is broadly consistent with prior evidence that negative emotion enhances memory for "central" details (those tied to the emotional response) more than positive emotion (e.g., Berntsen, 2002) : For the Yankees fans, it is likely that many of those "central" details were tied to the game itself rather than to the personal context.
**Insert
In addition to affecting the type of details remembered, valence also affected the quality of the memories. Most notably, negative valence was associated with greater memory consistency than positive or neutral valence. Consistency was relatively low, even for the negative group (roughly 60% of personal details recalled at Time 1 were reported in the same manner at Time 2), consistent with prior studies revealing substantial memory distortions even for negative events (see also Schmolck et al., 2000; Talarico & Rubin, 2003) . However, the present results suggest that the amount of distortion can be less for memories of negative events than for memories of positive or nonemotional events. This finding converges with laboratory research demonstrating that memories for negative information can be less prone to distortion than memories for nonemotional information (e.g., Pesta et al., 2001; Kensinger & Corkin, 2004; Kensinger & Schacter, in press; Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 2006) and with evidence that negative emotion can lead to fewer reconstructive memory errors than positive emotion (e.g., Levine & Bluck, 2004; Storbeck & Clore, 2005) .
Future studies will be needed to better understand the range of events for which this pattern is observed. Talarico and Rubin (2003) reported that memories for the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were less likely to be consistently remembered than memories for a personal event of the participant's choosing. The divergent results may reflect methodological factors, e.g., differences in the amount of time between the event and initial survey completion (1 day in Talarico & Rubin's study, and 1-6 days in our study) or second survey completion (1, 6, or 32 weeks in Talarico & Rubin, and 23-27 weeks in our study), or differences in arousal between their negative event and ours.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were almost certainly more arousing than the baseball game. It is plausible, and has been argued previously (e.g., Deffenbacher, 1983; Easterbrook, 1959) , that up to a certain level of intensity, negative emotion enhances the ability to recall detailed information, but that at higher levels of intensity, negative emotion may begin to have a detrimental effect on memory. Future studies will be required to examine this hypothesis. Nevertheless, the present results are important in demonstrating that there are some instances in which real-life negative events are remembered more consistently than positive or nonemotional ones.
In addition to affecting consistency, valence also influenced individuals' confidence in their memories. Those who found the event to be positive showed inflated confidence for both event-related and personal details. They had higher confidence in their responses than the negative or neutral groups, and yet they showed an inverse relation between their confidence ratings and their response consistency. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration that overconfidence can occur not only for highly negative events (e.g., Talarico & Rubin, 2003; Schmolck et al., 2000) but also for highly positive ones. This finding is broadly consistent with that of Levine and Bluck (2004) , who demonstrated that individuals happy about an event's outcome (the O.J.
Simpson verdict) adopted a more lenient criterion when deciding whether or not something occurred. The current results further indicate that this type of distortion can occur not only for event-related details, but also for personal details.
In summary, the present study provided evidence that events perceived as either highly positive or highly negative can be remembered with rich detail. Valence does, however, affect some memory characteristics: When an event is perceived as positive, memory appears to be more prone to inconsistencies and to overconfidence effects than when an event is perceived as negative. These results indicate that positive memories can be prone to the same types of distortions as negative ones, and further suggest that memories for negative events can be less prone to such distortions than memories for positive events. Coupled with prior studies (e.g., Berntsen, 2002; Levine & Bluck, 2004) , these data emphasize that even in instances in which valence does not affect the overall quantity of remembered information, the qualitative nature of the retrieved memories can be influenced by the event's perceived valence. Figure 1 . All participants who found the game to be positive or negative reported at least one specific personal detail after a six-month delay, and the majority of those participants were able to recall specific details for at least five of the six personal context questions that they were asked (see Appendix). These results suggest that positive versus negative valence does not affect the amount of personal detail remembered about an event.
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